The implications of the US withdrawal from Iran’s nuclear deal
On May 15th 2018, the Council held a closed panel discussion on the implications of the withdrawal of the United States from the Iranian nuclear deal on May 8th 2018, both on the process of nuclear non-proliferation and the regional situation in the Middle East. The symposium was held at the initiative of Ambassador Abdul Raouf Al-Raidi, Honorary Chairman of the Council, with the participation of Ambassador Dr.Mounir Zahran, President of the Council and a number of ambassadors, experts and academics members of the Council. The seminar concluded the following points:
1) The decision to withdraw within the framework of the Trump management strategy and vision in how to control the current international situation, and consistent with the impact of a number of inputs, the most important impact of Israel and Saudi Arabia, and revolves this strategic vision on preventing the completion of the changes of the international system to prevent the rise of China and the Russian Federation of transformation To the international poles competing, and to redress what the exercise revealed defects of the Iranian nuclear agreement (only to limit the military nuclear option, without addressing Iran’s missile capabilities and regional expansion of Iran), recognizing the performance of Trump of populism and transgressions and a challenge to International agreements – which is explained in the extreme roots of Yemen.
2) In this context, it is useful to take into account not only the European reaction, but also the specificity and robustness of Sino-Russian coordination (which is at the top of strategic coordination in the Arctic and in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
3) The next challenge is the extent to which the European position is consistent in opposing, or not in line with, US policy, and so far most of the European reactions are moving towards expressing dissatisfaction with the US position. In the medium and long term, especially with the size and weight of the US economy.
4) Here the views differ between expectations of a gradual European decline and the continuation of the European position, which will be the beginning of profound shifts in the structure of transatlantic relations. In general, the European side will have to try to persuade China and Russia to renegotiate other areas of conflict with Iran (missile capabilities – regional expansion) so that they can withstand American pressure or justify a retreat from the agreement if Iran does not respond.
5) The Egyptian strategy faces a delicate and complex position to balance several considerations.
• Considerations of partnership and deep common interests between Egypt and the Gulf States.
• Egypt’s consistent policy regarding the denuclearization of the region and other weapons of mass destruction.
• Egypt has reservations about the politics of Sunni-Shiite sectarian polarization and the complications it can cause in the region.
• Non-acceptance of Iranian expansion in the ‘Arab Mashreq’ and its opposition to Egyptian interests.
• The lack of relevance of Israel’s aggressive approach to this polarization in terms of Egyptian interests.
In the assessment, all these considerations affect the Egyptian position of the crises of the ‘Arab Mashreq’ and the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the issue of the Iranian nuclear agreement.
• There is an Egyptian interest to express more specifically these dimensions regarding the Iranian nuclear file and then to continue to open channels of communication with the Iranian side to follow the developments of the situation, many of which will depend on the European side.
6) On the other hand, the multiple dimensions mentioned in item 4 refer to the multiplicity of Egyptian decision-making inputs in relation to Iran and the Iranian nuclear file crisis, and there is a need for a calm Egyptian move to communicate between the parties and to remove or calm tensions and congestion, which requires consideration of changing the language of interaction with the Saudi and Gulf sides , which would allow the future to start a gradual and disciplined communication with the Iranian side through informal Egyptian channels, which will ultimately lead to two things:
The first is to calm the sectarian tension that Israel is benefiting from and is not in the interest of the region,
and second: to report and support the area of action and the Egyptian role regionally and internationally.